Since the early 2000s, China's central bank has been intervening actively in foreign exchange markets to prevent sharp appreciation of Chinese Yuan. At the same time, it issued central bank bills, a type of short-term central bank debt, to absorb the increase in monetary base caused by its intervention. This should have effectively neutralized the effects of intervention if the money multiplier were invariant. However, M2 and bank credit increased significantly during the period of sterilized intervention even if the monetary base remained almost unaffected, which implies an increase in the money multiplier. We reproduce these facts in a calibrated DSGE model wherein banks hold central bank bills issued as sterilization tools as liquidity management instruments. Banks reduce holdings of excess reserves as they hold more central bank bills, which raises money multiplier and leads to expansion of banks' balance sheets. Our DSGE framework allows us to study the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments. Compared to open market operations, raising required reserve ratio can directly freeze the excess liquidity and more effectively counter the effects of intervention. Allowing the central bank to use reserve requirement as an additional policy instrument can significantly reduce fluctuations in macro-economic variables.
Introduction
Since the early 2000s, China's growing balance of payments surplus has exerted great upward pressure on Chinese Yuan. To prevent sharp appreciation of the Yuan, 1 the People's Bank of China (PBOC, China's central bank) has been intervening actively in foreign exchange markets by purchasing foreign assets; thereby accumulating massive international reserves (Figure 1 ). When the PBOC purchases foreign assets, an equivalent amount of base money is released, putting expansionary pressure on China's economy. To neutralize the expansionary effects of currency intervention, 2 the PBOC issues central bank bills, 3 a type of short-term central bank debt, to absorb the increase in monetary base caused by intervention. As estimated by Ouyang, Rajan and Willett (2010) , monetary sterilization in China was virtually complete in the sense that the monetary base remained nearly unaffected. 4 Complete sterilization, which kept China's monetary base unaffected by its currency intervention, should have largely neutralized the effects of intervention if money multiplier were invariant.
However, M2 and bank credit rose significantly during the period of sterilized intervention even if the monetary base remained nearly unaffected, which implies an increase in the money multiplier ( Figure 3) . 5 This paper examines the extent to which open market operations 6 can neutralize the effects of intervention. In addition, it studies the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments and the optimal policy rules given China's current external policy regimes.
Central bank bills, issued as sterilization instruments, are highly liquid on China's interbank bond market. 7 During the period of sterilized intervention, central bank bill transactions on the interbank bond market increased to 40% of total transactions in 2008 (Figure 2 ). Moreover, central bank bills also have the highest turnover rate of all assets transacted on the interbank bond market.
1 Immediate appreciation of the Yuan might not top China's policy response list, due to either worries of losing export competitiveness (Reinhart and Calvo, 2002) or eagerness for international reserve hoarding (Ghosh, Ostry and Tsangarides, 2012) .
2 The officially stated objective of the PBOC is to "maintain the stability of the value of its currency and therefore promote economic growth", which indicates that two most important objectives of the PBOC are stabilizing nominal exchange rate and controlling domestic inflation.
3 The PBOC uses central bank bills as open market operation instruments due to its limited holdings of government debts.
4 According to Burdekin and Siklos (2008) , China even over-sterilized reserve accumulation. 5 Schularick and Taylor (2012) documented the divergence between money and credit growth in the past century with particular emphasis on how credit booms, rather than monetary expansion, leads to financial crises. 6 The most typical method of sterilization (in a narrow sense) is open market operations. In a broad sense, any activity of the central bank that is aimed to neutralize the effects of intervention can be considered as sterilization.
7 Assets transacted in China's interbank bond market are mostly highly liquid safe assets, such as, central bank bills, government bonds, and financial bonds (i.e. bonds issued by policy banks). China's interbank bond market is much more developed than its interbank unsecured lending market. Chinese economists even suggest that the PBOC use the interbank repo rate (REPOR) rather than the interest rate of unsecured interbank borrowing, i.e. Shanghai InterBank Offered Rate (SHIBOR), as the target rate in conducting monetary policy.
These facts imply that central bank bills can be substitutes for excess reserves in banks' liquidity management. When banks hold more central bank bills, they may reduce holdings of excess reserves.
This can raise the money multiplier and lead to expansion of banks' balance sheets. Thus, complete sterilization may not be able to sterilize completely since the issuance of central bank bills can have expansionary effects on the economy. Compared to open market operations, raising required reserve ratio can directly freeze the excess liquidity and more effectively counter the expansionary effects of intervention. Since 2008, the PBOC gradually stopped issuing central bank bills and begun to use required reserve ratio as a stabilization instrument, which may well reflect the PBOC's awareness of the benefits of reserve requirement policy (Figure 4 ).
Our model highlights the roles of liquid assets-excess reserves and central bank bills-in banks' liquidity management and the central bank's role in supplying liquid assets. In the model, all funds are channeled through banks. 8 Banks raise deposits from households and lend to firms. After loans are extended, a random fraction of the bank's deposits are transferred out of the bank. The deposit transfers can only be settled with liquid assets (excess reserves and central bank bills). If the bank has insufficient liquid assets, its reserves fall below the required level and it incurs a penalty. Thus, more lending relative to the bank's holdings of liquid assets increases it liquidity risk. In our model, currency intervention can have effects on bank lending by affecting the supply of liquid assets.
We explicitly model the balance sheet of the central bank. The central bank holds foreign assets and issues bank reserves and central bank bills. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the excess supply of (demand for) foreign assets is absorbed by the central bank, and external imbalances directly translate into changes in the central bank's balance sheet. Open market operations only replace one liquid asset (bank reserves) with another (central bank bills) without changing the total quantity of liquid assets. Thus, its effectiveness depends on the extent to which central bank bills are substitutable for bank reserves. In the extreme case wherein they are perfect substitutes, the Modigliani-Miller theorem for open market operations (Wallace, 1981) holds, and monetary sterilization has no effect at all. To capture the difference between bank reserves and central bank bills, we follow Andolfatto and Williamson (2015) and assume bank reserves can be used to settle a wider array of transactions than can central bank bills. 9 As results, open market operations have effects on the economy, but the effects can be limited.
Our model departs from the standard bank lending channel view by introducing banks' liquidity management. The standard view follows the textbook money multiplier, which suggests that reserve 8 China's financial markets are less developed compared with its banking system and a large portion of funds are channeled through banks.
9 For example, when funds is transfered from one bank to another, this transaction can be settled with either bank reserves or central bank bills. However, if funds is withdrawn by a household from ATM, it can only be settled with bank reserves (vault cash).
requirements constrain money creation and lending, and thus changes in monetary base directly affect the amount of lending banks can undertake. Per the doctrinaire view, complete sterilization, which ensures that currency intervention exerts no effect on the monetary base, should be able to neutralize the effects of intervention. In our model, however, excess reserves and central bank bills are substitutable for use in liquidity management and the excess reserve ratio declines as bank hold more central bank bills. Thus, sterilized intervention, which raises banks' holdings of central bank bills, endogenously raises the money multiplier and leads to expansion of banks' balance sheets.
In our model, nominal exchange rate is fixed and capital account is assumed closed. Following Chang, Liu and Spiegel (2015) , households are allowed to hold both domestic and foreign deposits; whereas foreign investors may not hold domestic assets. However, households encounter a cost to adjust the composition of their portfolio, which leads to a wedge in the uncovered interest rate parity condition. Thus, changes in the spread between domestic and foreign interest rates will lead only to finite capital flows.
We calibrate the model using macroeconomic and interbank bond market data from China. We use the calibrated model to examine the central bank's stabilization performance under different monetary policy regimes.
To help understand why the PBOC's complete sterilization during 2000-2006 failed to neutralize the expansionary effects of its intervention, we examine the responses of the economy following two positive external shocks-an increase in exports demand and a decrease in foreign interest rate.
We assume that the central bank conducts open market operations to fix the nominal monetary base, which reflects the PBOC's monetary policy stance during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . We find that the money multiplier and bank credit increase significantly as expected following a positive external shock.
Positive external shocks put upward pressure on the exchange rate of the domestic currency. Since the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the central bank absorbs the balance of payments surpluses by raising the monetary base. To fix the monetary base, the central bank issues central bank bills to sterilize its intervention. With more holdings of central bank bills, banks hold less excess reserves, which raises money multiplier and leads to expansion of banks' balance sheets.
We use the same DSGE framework to study the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments and optimal policy rules. We consider two external shocks-an exports demand shock and a foreign interest rate shock. We assume that the central bank potentially can employ two different monetary policy instruments-open market operation (OMO) and reserve requirement ratio (RRR). When it exercises either instrument, it has to follow a Taylor-style rule. We consider two monetary policy regimes. Under the first regime, the central bank can conduct only OMO. Under the second regime, the central bank can employ both policy instruments. For each case, the policy reaction coefficients are chosen to minimize a simple quadratic loss function of the central bank.
We find that by allowing the central bank to adjust the RRR according to economic conditions, volatilities in macro-economic variables decreased significantly. To help understand how RRR policy helps to stabilize the economy, we examine the responses of the economy under the two monetary policy regimes. When the central bank has access to both policy instruments, it sells fewer central bank bills and raises required reserve ratio when responding to the shocks. In this case, the money multiplier and bank credit raise less after the shock.
Related Literature
Traditional monetary policy literatures focus on the interest channel of monetary transmission, but we focus on the role of banks. The role of banking system in the transmission of monetary policy was less studied in macroeconomics, 10 and only recently have economists begun to explicitly model the banking sector in DSGE models, e.g. Curdia and Woodford (2009), Gerali et al. (2010) and Ennis (2014) . We explicitly model the banking sector and focus on banks' liquidity management. 11
However, we study an economy with Chinese characteristics. In particular, we study how sterilized intervention shifts the supply of bank credit by changing the supply of outside liquidities and the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments given China's current external policy regime.
Our paper also relates to the literatures that studies the central bank's role in supplying liquid assets. After the recent global crisis erupted, central banks in developed economies expanded their balance sheets to unprecedented levels via large scale asset purchases. Motivated by these dramatic changes in central banks' balance sheets, recent studies delve into the role of public liabilities in the economy and the role of central bank in managing the supply of outside liquidity. To shed lights on these issues, Williamson (2012) and Andolfatto and Williamson (2015) have constructed models in which public liabilities functions as medium of exchange, and Ennis (2014) and Bianchi and Bigio (2014) focus on their role in liquidity management of banks. Our paper also emphasizes the role of public liabilities, but in different context. Since the early 2000s, the PBOC has been expanding its balance sheet significantly as a result of its currency intervention. This also dramatically increased the amount of central bank liabilities (bank reserves and central bank bills). In this context, we study the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments and the optimal policy rules for the PBOC to counter the expansionary effects of its currency intervention.
10 Exception is Bernanke and Blinder (1988) 11 Classical literature that study liquidity management include Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) , and bank run literatures, such as, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , Allen and Gale (1998) , Ennis and Keister (2009) . However, Ennis (2014) , Bianchi and Bigio (2014) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) are the first ones which introduce the liquidity management of banks into general equilibrium models. In addition, Kashyap and Stein (2000) studies the liquidity holdings of individual banks and find empirical evidence for the bank lending channel.
Our work also relates closely to the analyses of the association between credit booms and capital inflows. Ample evidence shows that capital inflows increase before credit booms peak (Mendoza and Terrones, 2012) . In addition, Magud, Reinhart and Vesperoni (2012) has shown that capital inflows lead to more credit growth in economies with less flexible exchange rate regimes, and attribute the credit expansion to increasing monetary bases from partial sterilization.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the PBOC's currency intervention and monetary policy. We construct the model in Section 3, calibrate it in Section 4 and present empirical applications in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
Decoupling of Monetary Base and M2
Central bank bills are highly liquid on the interbank bond market, which can be ideal tools for banks' liquidity management. In this sense, central bank bills are good substitutes for excess bank reserves. As banks hold more central bank bills, they decrease holdings of excess reserves, which raises monetary multiplier and leads to expansion of banks' balance sheets. The PBOC's sterilized intervention (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) might have contributed to the decoupling of M2 and monetary base during the same period.
As shown in Figure 3 , during the period of sterilized intervention, M2 had increased significantly (by around 160%), while base money has increased only by around 90%. The divergence between 12 They are mainly bonds issued by Chinese policy banks. The switch from OMO to RRR management well reflected the PBOC's awareness of the ineffectiveness of sterilization, and also could be a response to the increased sterilization costs. Since 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of the US has been keeping the short term interest rates near zero.
Reserve Requirement Policy
The three-month interest rate on the US Treasury Bills drops below the three-month interest rate on the PBOC's central bank bills, which increased the "quasi-fiscal loss" of currency sterilization (Chang, Liu and Spiegel, 2015) . Besides the ineffectiveness of sterilization, the increases in sterilization costs could be another reason that made the PBOC switch from monetary sterilization to RRR management.
The Model
We consider a global economy with two countries-home country and foreign country. We focus on the problems of the home country and assume that the foreign country is passive.
The home country is populated by two groups of agents-patient households and impatient entrepreneurs. The discount factor of households is lower than that of entrepreneurs. Households save, consume and supply labor. Entrepreneurs consume, produce whole sale intermediate goods using capital and labor, hold capital goods, and borrow against the value of their capital stock.
The heterogeneity in discount factor determines positive financial flows from patient households and impatient entrepreneurs in equilibrium. All funds are channeled through banks. Banks raises deposits from households and lend to entrepreneurs. In addition, banks hold two types of liquid assets, excess bank reserves and central bank bills, as liquidity management instruments. The spread between lending rate and deposit rate depends on banks' liquidity management cost, which in turn is determined by banks' holdings of liquid assets relative to the size of their deposits.
Retailers buy whole sale intermediate goods from entrepreneurs, differentiate them into retail intermediate goods, and sell them to domestic goods producers, who assemble retail intermediate goods using a CES technology. The markets for retail intermediate goods are monopolistically competitive. Retailers set prices for their own products to maximize their profits subject to a price adjustment cost. Final goods are produced by combing domestic goods and foreign goods. In the labor market, labor intermediaries buy whole sale labor services from households at a competitive price and sell them in monopolistically competitive markets.
We assume households can hold both domestic and foreign assets, while foreign investors can not hold domestic assets. Households encounter a portfolio adjustment cost when changing their portfolio shares of domestic and foreign assets. Due to the imperfect substitutions between domestic and foreign assets, the model allows for deviations from the standard uncovered interest rate parity.
The central bank holds foreign assets and issues bank reserves and central bank bills. It adopts fixed exchange rate regime and conducts currency intervention to keep the nominal exchange rate at its target. The excess supply of (demand for) foreign assets are absorbed by the central bank.
In the benchmark model, the central bank is only allowed to conduct open market operation. In an extension of the model, we allow the central bank to adjust required reserve ratio in responding to changes in economic conditions.
Households
Households live for infinite periods. They consume final goods and supply labor. The preference of household i is given by
where C t (i) and N t (i) are the consumption and the labor supply of household i in period t, β ∈ (0, 1)
is the subjective discount factor, χ ∈ (0, 1) is the habit coefficient, ψ is the relative weight of leisure in the utility function, and ι is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Households hold domestic deposits D t (i), foreign asses F ht (i). The budget constraint of household is given by
where
Here, P t is the domestic price level, e t is the nominal exchange rate, w H t is the price of labor faced by households, R D t and R * t are the nominal interest rates paid on D t (i) and F ht (i), Π t and T t are the lump-sum transfers from household owned firms and the public sector, Γ t is the portfolio adjustment costs, andφ is the steady state share of domestic deposits in the total value of households' assets.
Define ϕ t ≡ D t /(D t + e t F ht ) to be the aggregate share of domestic deposits in the total value of households' assets in period t, which is taken as given by individual households. We assume the portfolio adjustment cost function Γ (.) has Γ (0) > 0.
Let λ t denote the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint (2). The optimal choice of labor supply implies
Let π t = P t /P t−1 denote the inflation rate. The optimal choice of D t (i) and F ht (i) implies
By linearizing both sides and combing the above two equations, we can obtain the generalized UIP (uncovered interest parity) condition: 13
In the presence of portfolio adjustment costs, changes in the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates only lead to finite changes in the households' optimal share of domestic deposits.
Labor Market
We assume labor intermediaries buy wholesale labor services from households at a competitive price w H t and sell them on monopolistically competitive markets. Labors sold by different intermediaries are considered to have different types. Competitive labor packers assemble the differentiated labor in a CES aggregator and sell the homogeneous labor to the entrepreneurs.
The individual labor intermediary takes as given the wage level W s t and labor packers' demand function and chooses a price W s t (i) to maximizes its expected discounted dividend flows subject to quadratic price adjustment costs. The labor intermediary i solves the following problem
where N t (i) is the demand for labor sold by intermediary i. It is given by
The wage level W s t is related to W s t (i) by
Here, θ w is the elasticity of substitution between different labors and Ω w governs the size of price adjustment costs.
13 In the absence of portfolio adjustment costs Γt, the above equation corresponds to the standard UIP condition.
In a symmetric equilibrium where W s t = W s t (i) for all i, the optimal pricing rule implies
Pt is the real cost of labor faced by entrepreneurs. In the absence of price adjustment costs, the real cost of labor w E t would be equal to the markup times the real wage rate w H t .
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs live for infinite periods. The preference of entrepreneurs is given by
where C e t denotes the entrepreneur's consumption in period t. Entrepreneurs' discount factor, β e , is assumed to be lower than that of households β.
Entrepreneurs produce whole sale intermediate goods, denoted by Y w t , using a Cobb-Douglas production technology which combines labor N t and capital K t :
where z a t is the productivity shock.
Entrepreneurs hold capital K t and borrow loans from banks, denoted by L t . The entrepreneur's budget constraint is thus given by
where mc t ≡ P w t /P t denotes the relative price of whole sale intermediate goods in terms of final goods, w E t is the real price of labor faced by entrepreneurs, R L t is the nominal interest rate on loans, q t is the real price of physical capital, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
We assume that the amount the entrepreneur can borrow from banks is constrained by her holdings of physical capital:
where ν is the loan-to-value ratio.
A representative entrepreneur chooses consumption C e t , capital stock K t+1 , labor input N t , and loan borrowed from banks L t , to maximize her life time utility (10), subject to her production technology (11), the budget constraint (12) and the borrowing constraint (13).
Let λ e t and µ t denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget constraint (12) and the borrowing constraint (13) respectively. The optimal labor demand is given by
The optimal choices of L t and K t imply
Retailers
Retailers buy whole sale intermediate goods from entrepreneurs at a competitive price mc t , transform it into retail intermediate goods Y d t (i) and sell them to domestic goods producers. Domestic good producers produce domestic goods Y d t by combing Y d t (i) using a CES aggregation technology. An individual retailer chooses the price of her own retail goods P d t (i) to maximizes her expected life time profits subject to a quadratic price adjustment cost. The optimization problem of the retailer i is thus given by 
Here, the price level of domestic goods P d t is related to the prices of retail intermediate goods In a symmetric equilibrium where P d t (i) = P d t for all i, the optimal price setting decision implies
where q d t ≡ P d t /P t denotes the real price of domestic goods. In the absence of price adjustment cost, the marginal cost of domestic goods production mc t would be equal to its price q d t times the inverse markup.
Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers produce final goods, denoted by Y t , by combining domestic goods, denoted by Y d t , and foreign goods, denoted by Y f t . The production technology is given by
Let P d t be the price of domestic good, and P f t be the price of foreign goods in foreign currency. Let e t be the nominal exchange rate. The demand for domestic and foreign goods are given by
Capital Goods Producers
Capital good producers produce capital goods using final goods. They have a linear technology and face an adjustment cost. The cost to produce a unit of new capital goods is 1−
Capital goods producers choose inputs I t to maximize the expected life time profits while taking the price of capital q t as given. Their objective function is given by:
The first order condition is given by:
Here, Ω i measures the size of investment adjustment cost. In the absence of investment adjustment cost, the real price of capital q t is always equal to one.
Banking Sector
All funds are channeled via banks. Banks can invest on three assets, which are loans, denoted by L t , central bank bills, denote by B t , and excess bank reserves, denoted by E t . The source of funds is household deposits, denoted by D t . Let rr t be the required reserve ratio. A bank's balance sheet is given by
Banks do not accumulate any net worth. They deliver all the profits they earned in each period to households as dividends. Let R Lwhich is given by
Here, φ t is the liquidity management cost which is endogenously determined.
Liquidity Management. Each period is divided into three stages-the lending stage, the liquidity management stage, and the balancing stage. In the lending stage, a bank raises deposits and builds its investment portfolios. In the liquidity management stage, an idiosyncratic shock hits the bank, and a fraction ω of its deposits are transfered to other banks. Here, ω is i.i.d.
across banks and over time, which has mean µ ω and variance σ 2 ω . When µ ω = 0, the liquidity shock only redistributes deposits across banks, but does not change the total size of deposits in the banking system. When µ ω > 0, there is net outflow of funds from the banking system. In the balancing stage, deposits that flowed out in the second stage return to the bank. Thus, the bank gets ωD t units of deposits back in the third stage. As results, the initial cross-sectional distribution We assume loans are illiquid and banks cannot do unsecured borrowing from each other. 14 The deposit transfers can only be settled with liquid assets (bank reserves and central bank bills). To settle a transfer, a bank can use bank reserves to make a payment, or use central bank bills to do a repo transaction. The inner period repo rate has to be one in equilibrium. Following Andolfatto and Williamson (2015), we assume that bank reserves can be used in a wider array of transactions than can central bank bills. With probability γ, the bank can only use bank reserves to settle the transaction; with probability 1 − γ, both bank reserves and central bank bills can be used to settle the transaction. 15 If the bank does not have enough liquid assets, its reserve falls below the required level. In this case, the bank has to pay a penalty which equals a fraction τ of the amount of transfer that could not be settled with its liquid assets.
Letω 1t (ω 2t ) denote the maximum levels of deposit outflows that can be settled with excess reserves E t (excess reserves and central bank bills E t + B t ). They are given bȳ
Thus, the expected liquidity manage cost for the bank is given by
Profits Maximization. The optimal choice of L t , E t , B t and D t implies
Open Market Operations. Given the amount of deposits D t , open market operations, which replace one liquid asset with another, only affectω 1t ; however, they have no effect onω 2t . As shown in (27)- (29) 
External Sector
Exports. Final goods Y t are exported to foreign economy. Let X t denote the amount of final goods that are exported. We assume that the foreign demand for domestic final goods is given by:
where P f t is assumed to be constant and normalized to one, and X t follows the following stochastic process
Here, ρ x is the persistence parameter, σ x is the standard deviation of foreign demand shock, and ε x t is i.i.d over time and has a standard normal distribution.
Foreign Interest Rate. We assume that foreign interest rate is exogenously determined and follows the following stochastic process
where ρ r is the persistence parameter, σ r is the standard deviation of foreign interest rate shock, and ε r t is i.i.d over time and has a standard normal distribution.
Balance of Payment. Let F t denote the total foreign assets of the home country. The current account surplus expressed in real term is thus given by
Since we assume that only domestic households can hold foreign assets, while foreign households do not hold domestic assets. Thus, the capital inflows should be equal to the decrease in the foreign assets held by households. The capital account surplus is thus given by
Central Bank
The central bank holds foreign assets and issues bank reserves and central bank bills. Let F ct be the foreign assets held by the central bank, M t be the nominal amount of bank reserves, B t be the nominal amount of central bank bills. Let T t denote the nominal tax revenue. The flow of funds constraint of the public sector is thus given by
We assume that the tax T t is just enough to cover the interest payment made by the central bank,
We assume that the central bank keeps the interest rate on reserves constant, i.e. R E t = R E .
Currency Intervention. The central bank adopts a fixed exchange rate regime, i.e. e t =ē.
The central bank intervenes in foreign exchange market to fix the nominal exchange. The excess supply of (demand for) foreign assets is then absorbed the central bank. Thus, we have
Open Market Operation. In the benchmark case, we assume that the central bank can only conduct OMO according to one of the following two policy rules. The first one is an interest rate targeting rule, which allows the policy rate R t to respond to inflation and output. The policy rate is the rate at which the central bank is willing to discount any amount of central bank bills (before the realization of liquidity shock). Note that central bank bill is an one-period short-term debt in our setup. The arbitrage between the market for central bank bills and the central bank's discount window ensures that R t = R B t in equilibrium. The interest rate rule is given bŷ
where φ rp and φ ry represent the central bank's preference for inflation and output stabilization.
The second rule is an monetary base targeting rule, which allows the nominal monetary base M t to respond to inflation and output.M
where φ mp and φ my represent the central bank's preference for inflation and output stabilization.
In the case where φ mp = φ my = 0, the central bank just fixes the nominal monetary base.
Required Reserve Ratio.
In an extension of the model, we allow the central bank to set the required reserve ratio (RRR) according to a simple Taylor-style rule:
where φ ep and φ ey represent the central bank's preference for inflation and output stabilization.
Market Clearing and Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions for final goods, domestic goods, labor and foreign assets are
where Adj t includes all the real adjustment costs.
Given the government policy and the world economy conditions, an equilibrium of the model is characterized by a sequence of prices {P t , P dentrepreneurs and the profits maximization problems of retailers, labor intermediaries, capital goods producers, and banks, and (ii) markets for final goods, intermediate goods, capital goods, deposits, loans, bank reserves, central bank bills, and foreign assets clear.
Calibration
The parameters are divided into five groups, which include the parameters in the utility function, those in the production function, those that characterize rigidities, those that characterize financial frictions, and those that are related to international trade. The values of calibrated parameters are presented in Table 2 .
For the parameters in the utility function, the subject discount rate of households β is set to 0.99. The subjective discount rate of entrepreneurs β e is set to 0.98 to ensure that the annual loan rate at steady state is around 6%. The relative weight of leisure in utility function is calibrated as ψ = 12 so that the working time is roughly 40% of total time endowment. The habit formation coefficient χ is set to 0.5.
For the parameters in the production sector, the depreciation rate of capital δ is set to 0.03. To ensure a high investment rate in steady state, which is a typical characteristic of China, the capital share in the production function η is set to 0.5. Thus, the steady state saving rate is around 45%.
For the rigidity parameters, the elasticity of substitution between different retail goods θ p is set to 10 which yields a mark-up around 0.11. The price adjustment cost Ω p is set to 60 so that the model is in line with a Calvo pricing model that has a duration of price contracts of four quarters.
The elasticity of substitution between different labor θ w and the wage adjustment cost Ω w are set to 5 and 100 respectively, which is consistent with the estimate by Gerali et al. (2010) . The investment adjustment cost Ω i is set to 2 so that the inverse elasticity of investment to capital price is around 2, which is consistent with Iacoviello (2005) . The steady state share of domestic assets ϕ and the steady state portfolio adjustment cost Γ (0) are set to 0.9 and 0.6, which is in line with the estimate by Chang, Liu and Spiegel (2015) .
For the parameters in the external sector, the share of domestic goods in the final goods α is set to 0.8 so that the import-to-GDP ratio is 80% in the steady state, which is consistent with Chinese data during 1990 . Following Chang, Liu and Spiegel (2015 , we set the elasticity of foreign demand for domestic goods ξ to 1.5.
For the parameters in the banking sector, the liquidity shock ω is assumed to follow a Logistic distribution, which is consistent with the estimate by Bianchi and Bigio (2014) . The mean of the liquidity shock µ w is set to 0. Thus, the liquidity shock only redistributes deposits across banks and does not affect the total deposits in the whole banking system. The penalty rate for bank overdraft τ , the share of transfers that can only be settled with bank reserves γ, and the standard deviation of liquidity shock σ ω are chosen to hit the following three targets: (i) a steady state excess reserve ration of 0.04; (ii) a steady state loan-to-deposit ratio of 0.73; and (ii) a steady state ratio of central bank bill transactions to deposits of 0.05 (quarterly). These targets are consistent with Chinese interbank bond market data during the period of sterilized intervention.
For the exogenous processes, we set the persistences of both shocks, ρ x and ρ r , to 0.9, and set their standard deviations, σ x and σ r , to 0.01. In this section, we examine the central bank's stabilization performance under different monetary policy regimes. We consider two external shocks-an export demand shock and a foreign interest rate shock. These two shocks can be the most important external shocks China faces.
Why Can't Complete Sterilization Sterilize Completely?
In this As results, bank credit rises even if the monetary base is kept fixed by the central bank. The spread between lending and deposit rates decreases due to the declines in the liquidity management costs. Thus, complete sterilization can not sterilize completely since the issuance of central bank bills has expansionary effects as well. The expansion of bank credit boosts aggregate demand, which raises output and inflation. As domestic inflation increases, real exchange rate appreciates since nominal exchange rate is fixed. This tends to decrease current account surplus and partially offsets the expansionary effects of the shock.
Second, consider the effects of a decrease in foreign interest rate. Fig.6 shows the dynamics of the model in response to the shock. An decrease in foreign interest rate triggers capital inflows, which put upward pressure on the domestic currency. To fix the nominal exchange rate, the central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market. Sterilized intervention increases banks' holdings of central bank bills, which facilitates banks' liquidity management. This leads to an expansion of bank credit, which raises the aggregate demand and inflation. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, inflation implies an appreciation in domestic currency, which worsens the current account and alleviates the expansionary effects of the shock. The stabilization performance is measured by an exogenous given quadratic loss function
where CA t /Ȳ denotes the current account surplus normalized by the steady state output. An alternative way to specify the central bank's objective is to use the households' welfare function implied by their utility function. However, most central banks receive mandate from governments which they have to fulfill. Central bank's loss function can be based on government's mandate rather than the model-consistent welfare function (Adolfson et al., 2011) . Furthermore, by including the volatility of current account surplus in the loss function, we intend to approximate the fact that the PBOC wants to avoid abrupt fluctuations in current account to protect China's export sector.
We assume equal weights and set λ y and λ ca to one. By allowing the central bank to adjust the required reserve ratio according to economic conditions, its stabilization performance is greatly enhanced. In particular, the standard deviations of loan dropped significantly, which indicates that the required reserve ratio policy does help stabilize bank credit. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the size of the central bank's balance sheet is affected by the external shocks. A positive external shock puts upward pressure on the domestic currency. To fix the nominal exchange rate, the central bank expands its balance sheet to absorb the excess supply of foreign assets. As results, the total amount of liquid assets (bank reserves and central bank bills) increases. Open market operation only changes the composition of these liquid assets while have no effect on their size. In contrast, raising require reserve ratio can directly freeze the excess liquidity. Thus, RRR policy helps stabilize credit by stabilizing the amount of liquid assets available to banks.
Under the optimal RRR rules, the required reserve ratio increases with the output growth and decreases with the inflation rate. An increase in the output growth calls for a policy tightening by raising required reserve ratio. However, the required reserve ratio seems not serve to stabilize inflation as its reaction coefficient to inflation is negative. Actually, to mitigate the fluctuations in the real quantities of liquid assets available to banks, a lower required reserve ratio is called for to release liquid assets to banks when the economy experiences an inflation.
In addition, the central bank's overall stabilization performance is enhanced by switching from (i) the combination of the standard Tylor rule and the optimized RRR rule to (ii) the jointly optimal rules. However, not all the standard deviations are decreased. Actually, the standard deviation of current account surplus decreases, while that of inflation increases. When the economy faces export demand shocks, there could be a trade-off between inflation and exports stabilization. After a positive export demand shock, the demand for domestic goods increases and the domestic price level rises. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, domestic inflation implies an appreciation of real exchange rate, which tends to reduce the exports, mitigating the expansionary effects of the shock.
In this case, the central bank may not be able to stabilize inflation and current account surplus simultaneously. The jointly optimal rule better balances this trade-off and thus enhances the central bank's over-all stabilization performance.
The Underlying Mechanism. To investigate how RRR policy helps to stabilize the economy, we compare the impulse responses of the key macro-economic variables to two external shocks under different monetary policy regimes.
We consider two expansionary external shocks-an increase in the export demand and a decrease in the foreign interest rate. The central bank's stabilization performance is significantly enhanced when it is allowed to use RRR as an additional policy instrument. With respect to credit stabilization, the central bank's performance is dramatically improved. However, with respect to inflation stabilization, the central bank's performance is improved less.
A positive external shock puts upward pressure on the domestic currency. To fix the nominal exchange rate, the central bank absorbs the excess supply of foreign assets by raising the monetary base. Under different monetary policy regimes, the policy instruments respond differently after the shock.
Under the optimal interest rate rule (blue-solid line), the policy rate increases to stabilize the economy. Since the central bank only has access to open market operation, it issues more central bank bills to push policy rate up to the target. As shown in Fig.7 and Fig.8 , the amount of central bank bills rises sharply after the shock. However, central bank bills are substitutes for excess bank reserves for use in the liquidity management. As banks hold more central bank bills, they reduce holdings of excess reserves. This raises the money multiplier and partially offsets the effects of contractionary monetary policy.
Under the jointly optimal rules (red-dashed line), both the policy rate and the required reserve ratio are raised to stabilize the economy. In this case, the central bank raises required reserve ratio to freeze the increase of monetary base caused by its intervention, and thus issues less central bank bills. As results, the policy rate and the amount of central bank bills increase less. Since the RRR policy freezes the excess liquidity generated by intervention, the monetary multiplier and bank credit increase less after the shock. We use the calibrated DSGE model to study the optimal choice of monetary instruments and the optimal policy rules given China's current foreign exchange rate policy. We compare the central bank's stabilization performances under two policy regimes. Under the first regime, the central bank can only employ OMO. Under the second regime, the central bank can use both OMO and RRR. By allowing the central bank to use RRR as an additional policy tool, its stabilization performance is enhanced significantly. In addition, monetary policy instruments respond to the shocks differently under the two regimes. When the central bank is allowed to employ both OMO and RRR, it raises RRR and issues less central bank bills when responding to positive external shocks.
